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When Emperor Alexander II came to power, the Russian Empire spanned more
than 8 million square miles between the Baltic and the Pacific. Not since the days of the
Mongols had the world seen such a tremendous amount of land joined together under a
single ruler. Despite a recent military defeat in the Crimean War, the Russian Empire
presented a picture of remarkable stability to the outside world. As revolutions rocked
Prussia and Austria in 1848, Russia, untroubled by any serious incidents, was secure
enough to send its own soldiers to prop up neighboring monarchies. It was not only an
absolute monarchy, but also the paragon and defender of the very concept.
Internally, however, the Russian Empire seemed entirely different. After a stay in
1839, the Marquis de Custine found the Empire “vast as it is, [...] only a prison to which
the emperor holds the key[.]”1 Custine’s comment was not only directed at the millions
who remained in serfdom. The fact that the founders, leaders, and language of this
massive state were Russian could lead an outside observer to assume it was
fundamentally Russian, but this was far from the truth. Russians were a mere plurality in
terms of the overall population, just 43.3% of the total at the turn of the twentieth
century.2 Starting with the Polish uprisings of 18301 and 18634, nationalism among
the subject peoples began to play a dramatic role in Russian politics. Over time, de
Custine’s original quotation assumed a new form: the Russian Empire as a “prison of
nations.”
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Russia’s revolutionaries, regardless of political affiliation, took notice of the
dissatisfaction among national minorities. None other than Vladimir Lenin made
reference to the Russian Empire as a prison of nations.3 As a radical Marxist, Lenin
initially stood opposed to nationalist movements, but as revolution gripped Russia in
1917, he found his fledgling state in need of support as the prospect of civil war loomed.
Through a mixture of compromise, appeasement, and force of arms, the newlyformed
Soviet Union triumphed over its ideological rivals and inherited most of the lands once
ruled by the Russian Empire. From their rocky start to their eventual collapse, the
Soviets were dogged by the national question to a greater degree than their
predecessors had been. Over the course of eight decades, the USSR would try and fail
to resolve the issues that plagued its beginnings.
Despite obvious dissimilarities, the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union were
both massive multiethnic empires: Russia among the first, and the Soviet Union
perhaps the last. For much of the last two centuries, they both grappled with the issue of
maintaining control over their ethnically varied subject populations in the era of
nationalism. This work aims to examine the development of both states’ nationalities
policies, their similarities and differences, and how effective they were in achieving their
aims. Considering the sheer number of national minorities exposed to regional
variations of central policy (if indeed a central policy existed at the given time), a truly
thorough examination of the topic is outside of the scope of this project. Instead, the
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Baltic region of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia will serve as something of a case study
from which to draw conclusions about Russian and Soviet practices as a whole.
Defining “The Baltic”
Why the Baltic region? Many peoples in many regions experienced the yoke of
Russian and Soviet rule throughout the centuries, from Ukrainians to Kazakhs to
Chechens, and most occupied a more concretely defined space than the nebulous
“Baltic.” To this day, the idea of “Baltic states” remains controversial in the very
countries it seeks to label. And thus, one who seeks to lean so heavily on the concept
must first offer some kind of justification.
The three peoples who inhabit the land on the southeastern portion of the Baltic
littoral defy true commonalities. In language, two of their tongues (Latvian and
Lithuanian) share the Baltic language branch, but the third (Estonian) belongs instead to
the FinnoUgric. In religion, Latvia and Estonia are historically Lutheran, while Lithuania
remains strongly Catholic. Latvia and Estonia share historical and cultural ties with
Germany and Sweden, Lithuania and Latvia with Poland. Based on these criteria,
Finland has just as much cause to be “Baltic” as the three countries currently labeled as
such. Even Latvia, the common denominator, has taken pains to emphasize its
differences with its neighbors.4 The Baltic region is an obvious construct, and one which
seems increasingly outdated.
Two defenses of the construct can be offered. The first is the one true shared
experience of the three Baltic peoples: Russian and Soviet rule. In the late 1700s, the
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Russian Empire became the first power to secure the whole of the region, which had
passed through the hands of Germans, Poles, and Swedes for much of the preceding
centuries. From that point on, these Baltic provinces of the Empire walked a similar
path, experiencing varying degrees of Russian repression before gaining independence
in the wake of the October Revolution. After 22 years, the three were promptly occupied
and annexed by the Soviet Union and remained Soviet republics until 1991. Unhappy
though the shared experience may be, Russian occupation provides a geopolitical
reason for grouping Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
The second defense, on the other hand, lies in the creation of national identities
in the Baltic region. Before the nineteenth century, Lithuania was largely subsumed by
Poland, and Latvia and Estonia were held by a German landed nobility. But starting in
the 1850s and 60s, all three began the process of nationbuilding. The names Latvia
and Estonia were coined in 1857, just as Lithuanian, Estonian, and Latvian grew in
popularity as literary languages.5 The Baltic peoples are not only linked politically
through the creation of their independent states, but also socioculturally through the
creation of their nations.
For a study of Russian and Soviet nationalities policy, the aforementioned
evidence is significant enough to overlook the controversy implicit in the use of the
Baltic construct. The shared experience of the Baltic peoples under Russian and Soviet
control allows them to be easily grouped, but differing cultural and historical roots allows
for a diverse picture of the nationalities question from the time of their “national
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awakenings” to final independence. Therefore, the Baltic states prove to be entirely
suitable for the role given to them.
Russification and Sovietization
There remains another matter integral to the study of Russian and Soviet
nationalities policies: that of russification, a concept often prone to exaggeration or
distortion. The etymology of the word, both in English and in Russian (
obrusenie
)
suggests an extreme meaning: to create or transform someone into a Russian,
essentially a form of forced assimilation. This idea of russification causes it to remain an
emotionallycharged topic for much of the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union,
especially in the Baltic’s small nations, mindful of this perceived threat to their very
existence. Even professional historians are not immune, with one Latvian scholar
suggesting that russification was the work of those “for whom it was unacceptable that
any part of the empire should remain nonRussian linguistically and culturally.”6
In reality, treating russification as fundamentally identical to forced assimilation
oversimplifies and unnecessarily vilifies a number of different Russian state initiatives.
In my further analysis of russification I will employ the categories established by Edward
Thaden, which divide russification into three varieties: cultural, unplanned, and
administrative.7 Cultural russification is the typical view of russification: forced adoption
of Russian language and culture, advocated by the more radical among the St.
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Petersburg elite. Unplanned russification has similar results, but the process occurs
without coercion; the new Russians gradually assimilate simply due to contact with or
life in Russian society. The final type, administrative russification, indicates the
replacement of minority languages with Russian in the official sphere. By far the most
common of the three in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, administrative
russification and its effects occupy the most prominent place in this study.
The process of sovietization is also worth mentioning in the context of Soviet
nationalities policy, though it is less central to the study of the Soviet era than
russification is to the study of Imperial Russia. Sovietization simply indicates the
process of assimilating a region into the Soviet system, including (but not limited to)
mass arrests and deportations, collectivization of agriculture, and the buildup of heavy
industry. Whether these measures constituted an indirect form of russification
throughout much of the Soviet Union is still very much a matter of debate, and
something this work seeks to address.
Russification is not the sole focus of this project. It was not the only noteworthy
policy of either the Russian Empire or the USSR, but it has received tremendous
attention and remains central to the Baltic national narratives. Therefore, russification
must be addressed to analyze effectively the policies of both Russian and Soviet
regimes towards the Baltic nationalities.
Historiography of Nationalities Policy
The study of Russian and Soviet nationalities has existed for decades, but it has
until recently been a difficult topic to engage critically. It began to be studied in the wake

6

of the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, with both the new Soviet state and the
fledgling nationstates of Eastern Europe offering research and theories. Early studies,
however, were characterized by the biases of the scholars who wrote it; nationalities
policy, especially Russification, remained a point of contention in the nonRussian
communities of the former empire, and Soviet research contained, naturally, an overtly
Marxist point of view. Following the 1940 annexation of the Baltic states by the Soviet
Union and the postwar establishment of communist governments throughout Eastern
Europe, studies of nationalities policy were affected by the Cold Warera mentalities of
the authors: Baltic and Eastern European emigres wrote with a nationalist bent, Soviet
and Eastern European governments continued to focus on Marxist critique of imperial
politics, and Western authors focused primarily on the Russian imperial experience. 8
Before the 1980s, it was nigh impossible to find a source that was not “marred by the
excessively national and ideological preoccupations of their authors.”9
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent restoration or acquisition of full
independence to the Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact countries by 1991, historians
gained unprecedented access to materials unavailable to them for seventy years. While
the field is still not free of nationalist influences, the last twenty years has generally seen
a relative explosion in quality material on nationalities in both the Soviet Union and
Russian Empire. It is in the context of these that this study is written, attempting to link
both studies of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Over the course of my
examination of nationalities policy between Alexander II and Mikhail Gorbachev, I aim to
8
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demonstrate that Russian and Soviet approaches in the Baltic states were not grand
ideological projects with transformative goals, but rather were born out of pragmatism
and a desire to maintain control. By focusing on shortterm stability, Russian and Soviet
authorities unintentionally aided Baltic independence.

The Baltic Region in Imperial Russia
During its centuries of expansion, the Russian state had acquired dozens of new
peoples, new languages, and new legal systems. It had largely avoided assimilation; its
territory was too vast and varied for those in centers of power to impose fundamental
changes upon its subject populations. Therefore, as in many other expansionist
empires, local power structures were adopted and local elites were integrated into the
growing imperial bureaucracy. The ethnic groups traditionally subservient to the local
elites remained in their previous positions, all but ignored by the central Russian
government in favor of their masters.10 By the nineteenth century, the situation had
begun to change: a series of emperors and empresses had carried out a gradual
process of centralization aimed at increasing control over nonRussian territories and
reducing dependence on local nobles, culminating with Nicholas I’s attempts to bring
local laws across the empire into line with the Russian standard.11 By the reign of
Alexander II, the Russian Empire still sat uncomfortably between a decentralized
patchwork empire and a modern centralized state.
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The Baltic region c. 1850. Estland, Courland/Kurland, and Livland, formerly the Duchy of Courland and
collectively known as the Baltic provinces, are now part of of modern-day Estonia and Latvia. Vilna,
Augustów/Suwałki, Kovno, Grodno, and Vitebsk provinces formed the Northwestern territory, now modern
day-Lithuania and the Latgale region of Latvia (then known by its Polish name, Inflanty.12
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At the time, the Baltic region had been fully under Russian control for over half a
century. The former dominant states of the region, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and
the Duchy of Courland, had been divided among eight provinces (
gubernii
): Estland,
Livland, Courland, Kovno, Vitebsk, Grodno, Augustów/Suwałki and Vilnius. The
province divisions poorly represented the ethnolinguistic makeup of the region, but had
succeeded in splitting it politically. True to the traditions of Russian expansion, local
Polish and German nobles had largely stayed in power over the Baltic peoples. But as
the state began to exert greater control over the Baltic, its policies came to be defined
through conflict with established elites and the rising consciousness of their subjects.
The Northwestern Territory - Imperial Lithuania and Latgale
For the purposes of this section, an examination of a unified Baltic region is, at
best, anachronistic and impractical. Due to significant differences in the social
composition of Lithuania and the different Russian attitudes towards it, it must be dealt
with independently of the more easily comparable Latvian and Estonian territories of the
Russian Empire. The roots of the divide lie in Lithuania’s historical affiliation with
Poland: since the fourteenth century, Poland and Lithuania had shared a king,
eventually leading to their constitutional union in 1569 as the PolishLithuanian
Commonwealth. Numerically inferior to Poles, Lithuanian nobles largely adopted Polish
language and customs. Integration became the norm for Lithuanians seeking to elevate
their social status.13 The upper classes of the former Commonwealth defied
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categorization along ethnic lines, instead tying their identity to their Catholic faith or
vanished state.
When much of the former Commonwealth was seized by the Russian Empire in
the midtolate eighteenth century during the partitions of Poland, the existing social
order remained largely intact. This caused anxiety among its Russian administrators,
who feared the existence and influence of such a “historical nation” and culture within its
own borders.14 Following the 183031 November Uprising throughout the
Russiancontrolled territories of PolandLithuania, their fears appeared justified. The
privileges enjoyed by the PolishLithuanian nobility were largely abolished, Russian
laws replaced local legal codes, and the Catholic Church became subject to official
discrimination. And yet, Nicholas I left untouched most of the lower nobility, who
remained dominant in local administration throughout the former Commonwealth.15 So
long as the region remained pacified, the Russian central government was content to
leave much of the local system in place.
When Alexander II took the throne, enough time had passed since the November
Uprising for his liberalizing reforms to include a general softening of repressive policies
in PolandLithuania. But in 1863, the January Uprising broke out across the region,
swiftly halting any concessions. With control soon reasserted over Lithuania, dramatic
new Russian policies came about in direct response to this second major uprising,
occurring only 22 years after the first had been crushed.. It had become clear to the
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Russian government that cooperation with local elites could no longer guarantee
stability, but few knew what could replace it.
In 1863, Mikhail Nikolayevich Muravyov was appointed as Governor General of
the Northwestern Territory, an area roughly corresponding to the former Grand Duchy of
Lithuania. The measures adopted during his tenure would make him known as a
“notorious voice of russification” throughout the region.16 Muravyov’s rhetoric presented
a radical departure from the moderation of Nicholas I’s time, referring to the
Northwestern Territory as “decisively Russian” and an “ancient property of Russia.”17 He
recommended the Emperor take steps to protect the Russian element present18 in the
Territory by exiling seditious elements and confiscating their land and property, then
filling the vacancy with Russian settlers. The Orthodox Church was to be supported at
the expense of Catholicism, and elementary schools in the Territory would begin to
teach “Russian and Slavic reading and writing [...] and the basic tenets of Orthodoxy.”
Lithuanian schools, if teaching in their native tongue, could no longer use books written
with Latin characters, a ban which would remain in effect until 1904.19 Muravyov
appeared to be advancing one of the first programs of cultural russification.
And yet, despite his aggressive promotion of Russian and Orthodox interests in
the Northwestern Territory, it would be difficult to claim that Muravyov actively sought to
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assimilate the Poles, Lithuanians, and Jews who formed a large part of the region.
Officiallyencouraged mass migration of Russian settlers to the territory, an effort to
strengthen the local position of Russian and Orthodox culture, certainly constituted a
gradual form of cultural russification, but the intent was less to russify and more to
depolonize. Muravyov was obsessed with “mad rushes of Polish propaganda” and the
“influence of the fanatical Catholic clergy.”20 His fears exemplified Russian fears of the
strength and appeal that Polish Catholic culture could have over the peoples of the
former Commonwealth, especially Ukrainians and Belorussians, but not excluding
Lithuanians. Konstantin Kaufman, Muravyov’s successor, shared similar radically
antiPolish and antiCatholic views, organizing a series of mass conversions of the
Catholic population.21 These ardent russifiers in Baltic history generally desired the
expanding of Russian presence at the expense of the Poles, if not the total cultural
conversion of the Northwestern Territory. As the fires of the January Uprising died
down, however, such radical ideas became increasingly hard to defend in the face of
opposition in Petersburg, where they had been tolerated if never wholeheartedly
supported.
Both immediately before and after the January Uprising, an alternative to
russification and depolonization was offered by prominent Slavophile thinker and linguist
Alexander Hilferding. While Muravyov primarily targeted the ruling Polish nobles,
Hilferding advocated for a strategy which scholar Darius Staliunas terms “divide and
rule,” avoiding assimilation in favor of pitting a loyal regional minority against a
20
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potentially disloyal regional minority, in this case the Lithuanians against the Poles.22 At
the time, the prevailing view of Lithuanians among Russian officials was dismissive at
best, with one Russian governor of Vilnius suggesting that an autonomous Lithuania
outside Russian or Polish influence ran “counter to history and common sense.”23
Hilferding disagreed, attempting to emphasize historical ties between Lithuanians and
Russians and claiming that Poland had driven a wedge between historical allies. To
bring the Lithuanians back as friends of Russia, Hilferding stressed education for their
recently emancipated peasantry, eschewing both Polish and Russian language
education in favor of Lithuanian itself. Teaching Russian to Lithuanians, he concludes,
“would mean [...] teaching them nothing at all.”24
“Divide and rule” never became the official position of the Russian government in
the Northwestern Territory, but its influence was still felt. Governor General Vladimir
Nazimov, Muravyov’s predecessor, encouraged introduction of peasant reforms,
elementary schooling in Lithuanian, and increased printing in Lithuanian.25 “Divide and
rule” appeared even among Muravyov’s forceful programs. Muravyov pushed for
redistribution of land from Polish landlords to Lithuanian and Belorussian peasants, as
well as the growth of vernacular education for Lithuanians.26 Even the notorious ban on
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Lithuanian publications in the Latin alphabet came from Hilferding’s ideas on splitting
the Lithuanians and Poles.
Russification and “divide and rule” were never mutually exclusive policies, and
both were used in attempts to weaken the power of local elites in Lithuania. In general,
however, more radical ideas rarely prospered in the region during Imperial Russian rule.
Despite the dramatic efforts of men like Muravyov, neither russification nor “divide and
rule” fully replaced the old imperial system of cooperation. By the turn of the twentieth
century, the regional administration had begun to question whether they had achieved
anything at all since 1863.27 Vaguely defined goals and inconsistent implementation had
failed to reinforce Russian control over Lithuania beyond the short term restoration of
the status quo.
Estland, Kurland, and Livland - Imperial Latvia and Estonia
In the northern Baltic, the lands of the former Duchy of Courland appeared vastly
different from their restless southern neighbors in the Northwestern Territory. Compared
to the violence and poverty that characterized Lithuanian territory in the 1860s, the
Baltic provinces were generally among the most developed in the Empire. Hilferding
noted that some had even hoped to solve the issue of unrest in the Northwestern
Territory by transferring a portion of it to the Baltic provinces, using the logic that the
calm experienced in the north would perhaps carry over.28 Estonian and Latvian serfs
had been emancipated nearly fifty years before their Russian counterparts, and their
position gradually had improved to include elementary education in their native tongues

27
28

Weeks, “Russification: Word and Practice, 18631914,” 4812
Hilferding, “Litva i Zhmud,” 383.

15

and the right to private property. The ruling classes were predominantly German,
th
present in the region since 12
century Baltic crusades. In contrast with the Poles of the

Northwestern Territory, Russian relations with the Baltic Germans were amicable:
Germans had long played a disproportionately large role in both local and central
government, and their loyalty was rewarded with the preservation of their traditional
privileges and legal system.29 But their reprieve was only temporary. The Baltic
provinces would experience a struggle similar to, if far more muted than, the one taking
place in turbulent Lithuania.
The creation of a unified Germany marked the beginning of the end of relative
autonomy for the Baltic Germans. After seeing Prussia seize territories with a
Germanspeaking population from both Denmark and France, some Russians feared
that Kurland, Livland, and Estland could be next. Prominent Slavophile Yuri Samarin
called for a program in the Baltic provinces similar to Muravyov’s in Lithuania,
demanding the interests of the Orthodox Church and the Russian people be advanced
at the expense of the Germans.30 Alexander II, however, prevented significant action
against the traditional rights of the Baltic Germans and Lutheran Church. He held little
regard for Samarin’s position, telling the representatives of the Baltic nobility that he
“spit[s] upon this press which tries to put you on the same level with the Poles.”31 For
the remainder of Alexander II’s reign, the Russian government largely resisted the
increasing pressures to enact reforms in the Baltic provinces.
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In the 1880s, Emperor Alexander III broke the traditional tolerance Russian tsars
had held for Baltic Germans since the time of Peter the Great. Confronted by a unified
German state as a rival on the European stage, Alexander III was wary of such a
powerful Germanspeaking minority within the Russian Empire and adopted policies
more in line with the ignored radicals of his father’s reign. His government began to
concern itself with bringing about administrative russification in the Baltic provinces.32
Under his rule, Russian was made the official language for municipal government, the
judiciary, police, and correspondence with regional governors.33 Russification was not
limited to the administrative sphere: as in Lithuania, a degree of cultural russification
was introduced to the region. After an inspection showed that the inhabitants of the
Baltic lacked “respect and understanding for Russian language, history, and literature[,]”
Russian became the language of instruction in elementary schools. The state also
began to reinforce the position of Orthodoxy in the region by funding proselytizing
Orthodox brotherhoods and the construction of churches.34 By the turn of the twentieth
century, the example of Muravyov’s Lithuania seemed to have been replicated in Latvia
and Estonia.
Elements of “divide and rule” were also present in Russian policies towards the
Baltic provinces. Along with the Slavophiles, some of the first voices to demand state
intervention in the press had been prominent Latvian and Estonian activists. To the
native Baltic population, Russian rule was preferable to continued German hegemony.35
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Russian officials of the time often responded positively: their administrative reforms
allowed for greater social mobility among Latvians and Estonians, even adopting a
proposal to create Riga and Reval provinces along ethnic lines. The resulting provinces
would have almost totally ended the dominant position of Baltic Germans in the region.36
While recommended to the emperor, the plan was ultimately rejected.
The rejection was in line with the hesitancy which characterized imperial policy in
the Baltic provinces. Nicholas II largely kept to the same path his father had followed,
but without the same conviction: during his reign the state ceased active promotion of
mass conversion to Orthodoxy and began to once again show preference for Baltic
German political parties over Latvian and Estonian nationalist groups.37 Russian reforms
had damaged the social standing of the Baltic Germans, but the Estonians and Latvians
who benefitted from this were angered by the implementation of cultural russification.38
As in Lithuania, the Russian Empire had shown itself to be incapable of adopting a
consistent policy. As revolt and revolution became a greater threat in the Baltic, the
state continued to seek shortterm stability instead of longterm control.

Baltic Nationalism and Independence
In 1855, few foresaw a future for the Baltic region outside of Russian, German, or
Polish hegemony. Yet just over 60 years later, the independent states of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania were created, wholly independent and coexisting with Russian,
Polish, and German states.To suggest Russian nationalities policy was responsible for
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the growth and success of the Baltic national movements would be an
oversimplification: Baltic nationalism, representative of a complex historical
phenomenon, can hardly be attributed to a single cause. At most, the Russian Empire
can be credited with facilitating an environment in which national sentiments could
thrive. Nevertheless, to understand fully the consequences of the Imperial era and the
difficulties faced by the Soviets in ruling the region, the experience of the Baltic nations
from “awakening” through independence must be explored.
When discussing the administration of Lithuania, Alexander Hilferding claimed
that because it “is so small and pushed between Russians, Germans and Poles, it
cannot think of independence[.]”39 Instead of separatism, Hilferding desired the
preservation and strengthening of Lithuanian language and culture, a plan similar to
those held by many intellectuals towards the Baltic peoples. While not without German
and Russian supporters, such a view was commonly held by Baltic nationalists
themselves.40 The names Latvia and Estonia would be created only in 1856,41 soon
after which the Lithuanians would rise up to fight for an increasingly Polish national
concept. With their national ideas still in infancy, the most radical Baltic thinkers sought
increased cultural, linguistic, and economic autonomy from German and Polish ruling
classes. Vernacular language printing exploded in the northern Baltic, with newspapers,
poetry, and national epics written by Latvians and Estonians emerging in the 1860s. In
Lithuania, where decreased literacy and the ban on Roman characters hindered local
authors, a cultural lifeline began in the form of smuggled texts from the small Lithuanian
39
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population in East Prussia.42 Over the next few decades, Baltic natives gained an
everincreasing foothold in the cultural, administrative, and economic spheres.
As nationalists came into conflict with traditional elites, they encouraged
cooperation with Russia to strengthen their position, as previously mentioned, but were
soon rewarded with the onset of Russification during the 1880s. Frustrated by the
continued power of traditional elites and the misguided and uneven Russian attempts at
intervention, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian nationalists declared their desire for full
autonomy within the Russian Empire in the wake of the 1905 Revolution. Independence
was still not strongly considered: even after German occupation in the First World War,
only Lithuanian nationalists pushed for true statehood instead of a national autonomous
zone within a larger power.43 If support for the idea among Baltic nationalists
themselves was mixed, it held even less sway over their rivals: Poles, Baltic Germans,
Jews, and large Socialist parties. The latter came into their own after the Bolshevik
Revolution in 1917, with the Latvian Rifles providing the fledgling Soviet government
with a core of professional military supporters. When nationalists felt confident to
declare the creation of three new states in early 1918, their future was far from certain.
In the ensuing chaos, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were able to carve out a niche for
themselves among the struggles of the Red Army, “White” anticommunists, the Polish
and German armies, and the forces of Baltic Germans and domestic communists. The
victory of the Baltic nationalists owed much to opportunism, but this does not diminish

42
43

Ibid., 80.
Plakans, 
A Concise History of the Baltic States
, 2947.

20

the accomplishment. In just 60 years, the Baltic states had gone from idea to reality.
Nearly all of the

21

The interwar Baltic states, with disputed/occupied territories marked.44

constituent peoples of the Russian Empire experienced a period of independence
following the Revolution. With the exception of Finland, all of them were later integrated
into the Soviet Union. Still, these brief triumphs of the nation did much to influence both
the nationalities and the Soviet policies designed to accommodate and control them.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania’s unusual 22year period of independence nearly outlived
all other breakaways from the Russian Empire, and therefore had a proportionally
greater impact.
Initially, all three Baltic states became democratic republics, operating on the
principles of Western European parliamentary democracies. Such a system helped to
curry the favor of Britain and France, as well as soothe the serious political divisions
which had emerged in each country’s war for independence. With the exception of the
banned Communist Party, the former political opponents of nationalism were well
represented: Socialist blocs typically dominated in the more educated and urbanized
states of Latvia and Estonia, while the significant national minorities of all three were
granted extensive freedoms in addition to ample political representation.45 The
newfound political power of Baltic natives allowed them to rapidly and radically redress
grievances against the traditional Polish and Baltic German elites. Massive land reform
acts confiscated 94% of the land of noble estates in Estonia, 84% in Latvia, and 77% in
Lithuania.46 While still wealthy, politically active, and allowed to use their native tongues,
Poles and Germans had been removed from their dominant positions in Baltic societies.
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In the first years of independence, the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians had at last
become masters over their lands.
The Baltic democracies were fractious and unstable, with coalition governments
regularly rising and falling. Eventually, like nearly all the interwar nations of Central and
Eastern Europe, authoritarian regimes took power: in Lithuania in 1926, in Estonia and
Latvia in 1934. The dictators of the three countries (Konstantin Päts in Estonia, Kārlis
Ulmanis in Latvia, and Antanas Smetona in Lithuania) had all been moderate
nationalists and founders of their respective states. Compared to fascist Italy or Nazi
Germany, the Baltic regimes were relatively benign, but similarly based their political
power on the will of the dominant ethnic group.47 The most radical expressions of
nationalism, such as the fascist groups 
Geležinis Vilkas 
in Lithuania and 
Pērkonkrusts
in Latvia, were repressed; at the same time national minorities lost some, but not all, of
the privileges granted to them by democratic governments. Moderate in character, the
dictators of the Baltic still advanced a clear nationalist agenda. By the time the Soviet
Union annexed the Baltic states in 1940, the once seemingly accidental countries had
become true nationstates.

Development of Nationalities Policy in the Early Soviet Period
Following the overthrow of the Imperial Russian government in the February
Revolution of 1917, the weakening of central power allowed all the varied opponents of
the former regime to assert some degree of influence over the future of the country. For
some, this entailed a transition to a more liberal state, retaining the borders of the
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Empire. For the dozens of minorities populating the borderlands, it meant seizing an
opportunity to gain concessions from the government, or even full independence. But
the most prevalent factions of revolutionary Russia were followers of Marxist
philosophy: the socialists and the communists. Just eight months after the initial
revolution, Vladimir Lenin’s Bolshevik Party seized power in a swift coup and
proclaimed the creation of the world’s first socialist state. The new government was
immediately challenged by its many rivals in a civil war driven by ideology and
nationality, forcing the Bolsheviks to rapidly adapt in order to maintain control.
The Bolsheviks had given much thought to the seizure of power, but were less
prepared for the administration of a massive and multiethnic state, particularly evident in
the evolution of their stance towards the national question. Before the October
Revolution, Lenin held a disdainful view of nationalism, claiming that national culture is
“the culture of the landlords, the clergy, and the bourgeoisie.” The culture of the
oppressed workers and peasants would be naturally inclined towards socialism and
internationalism, were it not suppressed by the dominant bourgeois nationalism.48 Lenin
rejected special privileges of linguistic and cultural autonomy for minorities, instead
favoring equal linguistic and cultural rights for the whole population. Shared culture and
language would be derived through economic ties, free of arbitrarily assigned borders
and state coercion.49 The Bolsheviks were confident of the ability of socialism to cross
ethnic lines. They outwardly supported the right of nationalities to secede from
imperialist states, but did not believe that secession from a free, socialist society would
48
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be an issue. Stalin himself claimed on the eve of revolution that ninetenths of the
minority peoples would not want to secede.50
Reality proved far different from the expectations of Stalin and the other
Bolsheviks, who found themselves battling not only their expected ideological
opponents, but also national uprisings across the periphery of the former empire.
Desperate for support, Bolsheviks compromised their initial stance on the nationalities
by acknowledging and encouraging military units organized on ethnic, rather than
partisan, lines, a measure forbidden under Imperial Russian rule.51 Soon after, the
Bolsheviks endorsed the creation of autonomous regions organized on national lines,
particularly for Muslim regions in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Often these regions
received barely any authority over central government decisions, but the gesture was
important both symbolically and as a rejection of early Bolshevik principles; the Party
began to assert that autonomy was necessary to economically and socially prepare the
borderlands for socialism.52 These massive improvised alterations of their stance toward
the national question proved successful: through compromise and military force, the
Bolsheviks gained control over nearly all of the former Russian Empire.
With civil war successfully concluded, the Bolsheviks did not adjust their
conciliatory attitude towards the nationalities. Instead, with the creation of the Soviet
Union in 1924, they enshrined it at the heart of their new state. Lenin, who had once
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argued that “Marxists will never, under any circumstances, advocate either the federal
principle or decentralization[,]”53 became the leader of a federation of ostensibly
sovereign republics. Each republic of the USSR was constitutionally granted the right to
diplomatic relations with other states, control over much of its internal affairs, and the
right to secede. The latter right was considered by Lenin to be an important step
towards the ultimate erasure of national distinctions: because coerced peoples would
never assimilate, a period of complete liberty was necessary.54 In practice, however, the
constitutional rights of the republics were marginalized before the central government.
Stalin personally believed that exercising the right to secede was a
counterrevolutionary act.55
In the buildup to the formation of the Soviet Union, Stalin had begun to exert
greater and greater influence over the nascent Bolshevik nationalities policy, eventually
clashing with Lenin himself. While Stalin initially agreed with Lenin on the need to “work
solidly and indefatigably against the fog of nationalism” and reject nationalcultural
autonomy,56 his very definition of a nation differed from Lenin’s. For Stalin, a nation was
not merely an ephemeral side effect of economic factors, but rather a “historical
construct which could not be abolished.”57 In general, Stalin was far more concerned
with the nationalities issue as a persistent threat to a socialist state than Lenin, with
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some even suggesting that he considered nations a more important historical catalyst
than classes.58 During the Civil War, Stalin was placed in charge of The People’s
Commissariat for Nationality Affairs (Narkomnats), responsible for addressing the
problems of national minorities. In this capacity, he advanced the implementation of
autonomous regions for the nationalities, attempting to parcel the various peoples of the
Caucasus and Central Asia into ethnically homogenous units. Stalin hoped territorial
autonomy within the existing Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)
would prove sufficient to quell the national problems of the new state, but Lenin, fearing
accusations of Russian chauvinism and continued unrest, overrode him, pushing for a
federal state. 59 Ultimately, Lenin’s vision for the construction of the USSR triumphed, but
his illness and death in 1924 left Stalin largely unopposed in the realm of nationality
affairs.
In the Soviet republics, the 1920s became a time of nationbuilding. Stalin
believed that to end the national question, the masses of each republic should become
engaged in the administration of their own territory and develop their language and
culture. Thus began the policy of 
korenizatsiya 
(nativization, or “making roots,”) a major
push to include more representatives of national minorities in the Party. Never
completely effective, 
korenizatsiya 
managed to raise the number of native participants
in local Party structure to 53.8% by 1932.60 For the first time, many ethnic groups with
no history as an independent state before the Civil War had now had both
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clearlydefined borders and national leaders. Soviet leadership also concerned itself
with the standardization of languages across the republics, creating writing systems for
peoples who lacked them in order to advance literacy throughout the USSR. Many
nativizing policies were conscious rejections of the former regime: new national histories
were actively encouraged to emphasize the struggle against Russian imperialism.61
With Lenin gone, Stalin could actively alter Lenin’s theories towards the national
question to suit the new reality, claiming that the erasure of national differences would
not occur until after the success of the world revolution, and that it was “obvious that
Lenin was entirely and completely in favor of developing national culture under the
dictatorship of the proletariat[.]”62 The Bolsheviks had gone from reluctant adoption of
autonomy to a fullblown embrace of national differences within socialism. The national
question had been put to rest, all while allowing the central government to retain its grip
on the country as a whole.
However, starting in 1932, Stalin began to restrict privileges granted to the
republics in the previous decade. He declared that improper implementation of
korenizatsiya
had allowed bourgeois nationalists and other counterrevolutionaries to
infiltrate the local Party structures of the republics, beginning a long period of national
repression.
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had been challenged, and he thus sought to remove the troublesome elements while
still giving the required platitudes to the idea of sovereign republics. Throughout the
1930s, the leaders of every republic or autonomous region (with the exceptions of
Azerbaijan and Georgia) were purged. The nationalist histories of the 1920s were
officially condemned, replaced with “primordialism,” which shifted the focus of national
history from resistance to Russian imperialism to the ancient past. The Russian people
and their culture were placed in the center of the Soviet project, and Russian language
education was made mandatory.65 
Korenizatsiya 
was reversed: by 1937, minority
membership in local Party organizations had fallen back to 45%.66 Caught up in the
broad sweep of Stalinist terror, the national communism of the 1920s had been brought
to heel.
Yet at the end of the 1930s, the national question in the USSR was far from
settled. The inefficacy of Imperial Russian policies in the borderlands had embittered
the minorities and empowered national groups to a degree unexpected by the
Bolsheviks, forcing a compromise to ensure the survival of the socialist state. By
organizing the USSR in line with the concessions to nationalities, Lenin and Stalin
established a dangerous precedent of granting rights to the minorities which they had
no intention of allowing them to truly use. Previously vague and disparate peoples
united thanks the creation and codification of national subunits in the 1920s, only to
promptly experience marginalization and repression in the 1930s. The uneasy
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compromise at the heart of the Soviet system would only be weakened by the
annexation of the three independent Baltic states.

The Second World War in the Soviet Union and the Baltic States
Throughout the 1930s, the Baltic states, like many Eastern European countries,
attempted vainly to preserve their independence in the face of Nazi and Soviet
aggression. Militarily, they stood little chance of defeating or even checking any
advances into their territory; geography granted them no advantages akin to those
enjoyed by Finland67 and the three states were not allied to even each other, let alone
any larger power. They relied instead on diplomatic measures: France and Great Britain
were courted, nonaggression pacts were signed with the Soviet Union, and Lithuania
ceded the Memel/Klaipėda territory to Germany. Acutely aware of their lack of
bargaining power, the Baltic states hoped a strategy of appeasement would at least
ensure their existence.
Appeasement reached its height soon after Germany and the Soviet Union
invaded Poland in September 1939. Unbeknownst to the Baltic states, the
MolotovRibbentrop Pact had determined not only Poland’s future, but also their own:
the Soviets, free of German interference, now considered Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
as part of their sphere of influence. Under threat of military force, the Baltic states were
compelled to sign treaties of mutual assistance with the USSR in October and
November. They retained their independence, but tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers
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were now stationed in their territory. Of the three nations, only Lithuania, which was
awarded Vilnius from conquered Poland, received significant compensation.68 After
several months, the Baltic countries’ continued claims of neutrality ended by Soviet
ultimatum in June 1940. Accused of failing to abide by the terms of the earlier treaties,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania accepted free movement of Soviet troops and the
formation of new governments. New elections voted in leftist governments by over 90%
of the vote after the suppression of all other parties,69 and in August the Baltic states
formally became part of the Soviet Union. After just 22 years, Baltic independence was
over, one of the first casualties of growing European conflict.
The First Soviet Occupation, 1940-1
Even before officially joining the USSR, the inhabitants of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania began to experience life under Stalinism. The small local communist parties
took power following their legalization in June of 1940, supplemented by trained Soviet
communists of Baltic descent and the might of the Red Army.70 Their objective was to
rapidly bring the formerly independent states in line with the Soviet model and suppress
potentially disloyal elements. With the exception of the Lutheran and Catholic churches,
most organizations, large businesses, and industries were seized by the state. Some
attempts were made to endear the new governments to the people: another wave of
land reform saw remaining estates redistributed to poor or landless farmers, and wages
for the working classes increased on paper. These changes were rendered pointless,
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however, by rising prices and the nationalization of banks.71 For the most part, the Baltic
states were initially spared the worst aspects of Stalinism to prevent local unrest, but
sovietization was gaining momentum.
The most extreme sovietizing measure used in the first occupation of the Baltic
states could be seen in its reliance on deportations. Beginning in June 1940,
highlyplaced military and public officials were quietly imprisoned and removed from the
region by the new authorities. Their numbers were in the thousands, but the piecemeal
nature of the arrests kept them from reaching the scale of previous Stalinist purges.72
But after a year of Soviet rule, the deportations abruptly accelerated. On the night of
th
June 13
, 1941, approximately 10,000 Estonians, 15,000 Latvians, and 18,000

Lithuanians were arrested and sent to camps without trial.73 Only some had been
named as enemies of the working class: most were the families of the accused.74 It
seemed as though the brief period of quasisovereignty in the Baltic region was ending
and being replaced with a new era without any concessions to soften the heavyhanded
tactics of the Stalinist regime. But just a week after the first round of mass deportations,
Operation Barbarossa left the future of the Baltic states uncertain. Even before the
Germans arrived, thousands of guerrillas had killed hundreds of retreating Soviet
soldiers and established a provisional government in Lithuania.75 The first period of
Soviet occupation in the Baltic region had left the process of sovietization incomplete:
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instead of ending resistance to Soviet rule, it had only spurred resentment among the
Baltic peoples.
Soviet Nationalities Policy during the Great Patriotic War
In the first months of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht
captured much of the European part of the Soviet Union, including the entirety of the
Soviet republics of Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine. These
republics had either been acquired or expanded through Soviet force in the previous
two years, and the memory of Stalinist excesses was still fresh. Often, the arrival of
German troops was welcomed by the local population.76 The Soviet minorities would
eventually turn against the raciallymotivated policies of repression and extermination
practiced by the Germans, but their initial reception of the invaders clearly demonstrated
the weakness of Soviet rule in its borderlands.
Its existence threatened, the USSR once again responded with compromise and
contradiction. To mobilize the nationalities for the war effort, renewed stress was placed
upon the unity and friendship shared among the Soviet peoples as they worked together
to defeat the “fascist barbarians.”77 In military terms, this entailed the resurrection of
national military units, previously banned in 1938, and the acceptance of nationalist
partisan units willing to cooperate with the Soviets.78 Restrictions were loosened in the
cultural realm as well: the war years saw a brief resurgence in the nationalist histories of
the 1920s and the idolization of prerevolutionary historical figures.79 One of the most
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significant official acknowledgements of the nationalities during the war occurred in
1944, when a constitutional amendment granted extensive privileges to the constituent
republics of the Soviet Union. Formally, the republics gained the right to establish
ministries of foreign affairs and raise their own troops, furthering the original goals of
Soviet federalism. In practice, however, little changed for the republics.80 Any wartime
gains would prove temporary.
A more lasting consequence of the war was the continued growth of Russian
chauvinism. From the outset of the conflict, the Great Patriotic War was framed as a
distinctly Russian defense of the homeland. To a far greater extent than the subject
nations, Russia, its history, and its national heroes were used to inspire patriotism
among the populace. Russians became the “first among equals” or “older brother” to
the other nationalities, leading the way to and assuming the primary burdens of
socialism.81 Confusingly, the Soviet state advanced the message of Russian
exceptionalism concurrently with its temporary tolerance of national histories. Until the
end of the war, the state offered conflicting versions of patriotism in its attempts to
motivate as much of the population as possible.
By the war’s end, the Soviet Union had to no small degree assumed the position
of the former Russian Empire. It had advanced into the former imperial possessions of
Poland, Finland, Moldova, and the Baltic states, and now stood on a platform of
Russian chauvinism, once so decried by its founders. Unlike Imperial Russia, however,
the USSR continued to offer its subject peoples rights which it would not allow them to
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exercise. By failing to present a consistent stance on the national question, the Soviets
were only breeding resentment among the nationalities.

The Baltic Region in the Soviet Union
The Baltic region emerged from the Second World War deeply changed. The war
had divided the populace: hundreds of thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and
Lithuanians had volunteered or were conscripted into the Red Army, the SS, or
nationalist partisan movements. In the Baltic, the Second World War often resembled a
domestic conflict when the national units of differing armies clashed.82 At the end of the
war, approximately 30,000 Lithuanians, 15,000 Latvians, and 10,000 Estonians
continued guerrilla resistance against the Soviet Union..83 Additionally, the prewar
diversity which characterized the interwar Baltic region had disappeared after five years
of occupation and war. The Jewish population, particularly large in Lithuania, was a
victim of the Holocaust; the Baltic Germans had left through a mixture of Nazi incentives
and Soviet coercion in 1940; and a significant amount of the leadership and
intelligentsia, fearing the return of Soviet rule, fled the country.84 In 1944, the triumphant
Red Army occupied a different region from the one they had seized four years earlier:
the Baltic states were now ethnically homogenous and actively opposed to Soviet
power.
The immediate resumption of aggressive sovietizing tactics did little to soothe
tensions in the region. Deportations immediately resumed: between 1940 and 1954,
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203,590 Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were deported from the total combined
population of 5,611,000, a loss of approximately 3.6%.87 The Soviets had downplayed
the possibility of collectivization during the first occupation,88 but now implemented it in
earnest. As small farms disappeared, so did the support base for nationalist guerrillas,
whose numbers dwindled until their final eradication in the early 1950s. The largely
destroyed industry of the region began rapid reconstruction, but the depleted populace
was unable to fill the needed positions. Consequently, 400,000 Russians and 100,000
representatives of other nationalities (largely Ukrainians and Belarusians) arrived to
seek employment in Latvia by the end of the 1950s, while 180,000 Russians came to
Estonia. Lithuania, on the other hand, was able to escape the worst of the mass
migrations due to its larger population, continued partisan activities, and agrarian
economy.89 Whether driven by economic factors or intentionally encouraged as a
pacifying and russifying measure by the state (as many believed in the Baltic states
themselves,90 ) the influx of Russianspeaking immigrants helped stabilize the region and
support the local communist parties, in which Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians only
comprised 3040% of the total membership.91 Upon the eve of Stalin’s death in 1953,
the Baltic region had become fully integrated into the Soviet system.
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Republic

1945

1959

1970

1979

1989

Estonia

94

75

68

65

62

Latvia

80

62

57

54

52

Lithuania

78

79

79

80

80

Percentage of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians in the total population of their titular
republics.92

Republic

1959

1970

1979

1989

Estonia

20

25

28

30

Latvia

27

30

33

34

Lithuania

9

9

9

9

Percentage of Russians in the total population of the Baltic republics.93

After Stalin: Reform and Reaction, 1953-82
Despite Stalin’s efforts to “solve” the nationalities problem, his successors
remained troubled by it. Like Stalin before them, Khrushchev and Brezhnev were forced
to pander to the nationalities, beginning their periods of rule with a relaxation of
nationalities policy in order consolidate power before later attempting to reassert control.
94

But as more powers devolved from the central government to the union republics, this

cycle of reform and reaction became difficult. Unwilling or unable to use the degree of
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coercion employed by the Stalinist state, however, Stalin’s successors garnered only ill
will and open protest, not lasting stability.
Immediately after Stalin’s death, this use of national and federal concessions
manifested itself in the ensuing struggle for power. Lavrentii Beria, the powerful head of
Soviet security forces, tried to parlay favor among the nationalities in a bid to edge out
his rivals. In Lithuania and Ukraine, he introduced measures to increase the
involvement of locals in Party apparatus of the republics, culminating in the naming of
an ethnic Ukrainian to the position of First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party.
Beria had further plans for the Baltic in particular: the Russian Second Secretaries of
the Baltic parties were all replaced with locals.95 In line with these policies, the Soviet
press strongly condemned Russian chauvinism and encouraged the development of
national languages and cultures.96 When Beria was arrested in June 1953, the charges
against him included inspiring bourgeois nationalism in the republics. 97 His execution
signaled the end of his radical approach towards national politics, but his opponents,
Khrushchev among them, were aware that such a tactic could have been enough to
propel him to power.98 The nationalities factor had gained the potential to be a Soviet
kingmaker.

Fowkes, 
The Disintegration of the Soviet Union
, 76.
Simon, 
Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union
, 229230.
97
Smith, 
Red Nations
, 193.
98
Walter Connor and Jeremy Azrael, cited in Kemp, 
Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union
, 243.
95
96

39

Khrushchev (1953-1964)
Well aware of this fact, Khrushchev, the ultimate victor of the power struggle,
adopted a similar, if slightly milder, form of Beria’s nationalities policy. Some of Beria’s
changes were reversed: the Second Secretaries of Lithuania and Latvia were replaced
by Russians in 1955 and 1956, respectively.99 Rather than directly appeal to the
nationalities as Beria had, Khrushchev instead positioned himself as a return to the
Leninist roots of the party, claiming that socialism sought to develop the economy and
culture of all different peoples.100 A tremendous amount of economic and administrative
powers were delegated to the republics, particularly after Khrushchev introduced his
sovnarkhoz 
(an abbreviation for “national economic council”)
reform. Across the USSR,

portions of the system of central planning were dismantled and replaced by a network of
local economic councils, removing power from Khrushchev’s opponents in Moscow and
appeasing the republics by allowing them unprecedented control of their own economic
affairs.101 The reform came soon after Khrushchev had successfully defended himself
from a challenge from Stalinists within the party who had accused him of encouraging
nationalism.102 With the support of the union republics, Khrushchev secured his place at
the head of the Soviet Union, and in turn, the republics were rewarded.
In 1962, Khrushchev declared that the nationalities problem had been solved in
the Soviet Union.103 In spite of this optimistic proclamation, relations between
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Khrushchev and the republics had been deteriorating for years. Unlike Beria, an
outspoken critic of Russian chauvinism, Khrushchev subscribed to the Leninist idea of
an eventual merger of the nations, with the Russians leading the way as first among
equals.104 As he had demonstrated by crushing the Hungarian uprising of 1956,
Khrushchev held little love for nationalism, regardless of his support for the union
republics. With his major challengers defeated, Khrushchev was worried by growing
trends of nationalism and 
mestnichestvo
(“localism,” or the tendency to meet local
needs before contributing to others) his own country. He addressed these concerns
with the release of The Theses on Education in 1958, Article 19 of included the
following statement:
If a child attends a school where instruction is conducted in the language of one
of the union or autonomous republics, he may, if he wishes, take up the Russian
language. And viceversa, if a child attends a Russian school, he may, if he so
desires, study the language of one of the union or autonomous republics.105
. Seemingly innocuous and couched in terms of parental choice, Article 19 in practice
meant that Russian schools were free to drop local languages and local schools would
still need to teach Russian, which Soviet media advanced as “the second native tongue”
of socialist nations.106 Protests against Article 19 were greeted with purges of local
parties. By the early 1960s, Khrushchev, frustrated by a lack of economic improvement,
began to bring economic decisionmaking powers back to the central government.107
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When Khrushchev left power in 1964, he was in the process of reversing nearly all his
previous decentralizing reforms.
The Baltic Republics under Khrushchev
As in all the union republics,
Khrushchev’s early reforms were wellreceived in

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. They still felt the aftershocks of Stalinist repression; there
were no calls for independence or armed resistance as in the previous decade. But the
Baltic republics still sought to use whatever powers were granted to them to their fullest
extent in order to improve their own territories.108 By the latter half of the Khrushchev
era, the leaders of each republic found different ways to balance their obligations to the
central government and their local needs with varying degrees of success.
Of the three Baltic republics, Estonia was, at the time, largely unremarkable. It
was led by Johannes Kӓbin, an Estonian raised in Leningrad and trained in the USSR to
establish Soviet rule in Estonia.109 Kӓbin was loyal to Moscow and had little love for
Estonia, endearing him to Stalin and Khrushchev.110 Despite his lack of national
sentiment, Kӓbin proved willing to stand up to Moscow on occasion, as seen in his
opposition to Article 19 of the Theses on Education and continued insistence on
Estonian language education. These brief acts of defiance earned him goodwill in
Estonia (as did his willingness to learn the Estonian language and culture) without
damaging his standings with the central government, enabling him to stay in power for
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26 years.111 Such a figure was not atypical among the First Secretaries of the union
republics.
In Latvia, however, a nearly opposite trend emerged. Jānis Kainbērzins, the First
Secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia, struggled to keep other local party
members in line, particularly Eduards Berklāvs, Deputy Chairman of the Council of
Ministers. Berklāvs opposed the establishment of more heavy industry in Latvia,
seeking to limit the influx of Russianspeaking immigrants, first by attempting to alter the
economic plans set by Moscow, then more brazenly planning to evict residents who did
not begin to learn Latvian after two years of residence.112 The Latvian Communist Party
also led the opposition to Khrushchev’s language policies, first by passing a 1956
resolution requiring all Party leaders to be fluent in both Latvian and Russian, then by
refusing to implement Article 19, choosing to add another year of secondary education
instead.113 The union republics had received extensive privileges, but the actions of the
Latvian SSR constituted outright defiance and localism, if not outright national
communism. In 1959, Khrushchev personally flew to Riga and oversaw the removal of
thousands of members of the local Party, including Berklāvs and Kainbērzins.114 The
confrontation in Latvia, while quickly ended, demonstrated the dangers inherent in
Khrushchev’s reforms.
Lithuania, on the other hand, presents a unique case not just among the Baltic
republics but in the entire Soviet Union. From 1940 to 1974, Lithuania was under the
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control of First Secretary Antanas Sniečkus, a Lithuaniaborn but Moscowtrained
communist. Sniečkus began his political career as a dedicated Stalinist and personally
oversaw over the postwar deportations and attempted destruction of Lithuanian
national culture. By the Khrushchev era, he had both thoroughly asserted his control
over the Lithuanian Communist Party and proven his loyalty to Moscow.115 As
Khrushchev reacted against his previous liberal attitude towards the nationalities,
however, Sniečkus more and more treated the interests of his own republic with greater
respect than the party line. Lithuania shared the same issues as Estonia and Latvia,
such as native language education, Russian migration, and the development of heavy
industry, but Sniečkus was aided by his established position in the Party hierarchy and
by Lithuania’s demography, unique among the Baltic republics. Like his Estonian and
Latvian colleagues, Sniečkus protested Article 19, a more reasonable demand for a
republic without a significant Russian population.116 Lithuania’s industrial development
began only in the late 1950s, nearly a decade after Estonia and Latvia. With economic
powers in local hands, Sniečkus could shape the industries around Lithuania’s needs
and circumstances, encouraging smaller industries in areas with the labor pool to
accommodate them. Drawing on Lithuania’s larger and more rural population, there was
little need for Russian migrant labor.117 Sniečkus also succeeded in altering the ethnic
makeup of the Lithuanian Communist Party: by 1970, 67% of its membership were
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Lithuanian.118 Through canny political leadership, Lithuania managed to advance its
own agenda while avoiding purges.
The Baltic republics present a study in contrasts during the 1950s and 1960s. All
three utilized their new powers under Khrushchev’s reforms to varying degrees. In
Estonia, obedience to Moscow was rewarded with only continued industrialization and
Russian migration. In Latvia, a full embrace of the reforms revealed their shallowness:
any overt attempts at defending regional interests were quashed by the state. Only
Lithuania, with its astute leadership and unique socioeconomic situation, was able to
meet adequately both its own needs and those of the central government. The reforms,
rather than addressing the concerns of the union republics, succeeded in demonstrating
their desire for a different path.
Brezhnev (1964-1982)
When Khrushchev was ousted from power in 1964, the republics did not attempt
to defend him. In gratitude for their support, Leonid Brezhnev, the new leader of the
Soviet Union, did not accuse Khrushchev of nationalism and pledged to keep “national
cadres” intact within local Party apparatus.119 In contrast to his predecessors, Brezhnev
was content to ignore the nationalities issue for almost the first decade of his rule. Some
reforms were rolled back, including both the network of 
sovnarkhozy 
and the Theses on
Education, but the republics retained a large degree of control over their own territory.
As long as Russians remained atop the central Party structure, the republics were
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allowed to keep to their own affairs, a situation Ben Fowkes dubs “the corporatist
compromise.”120 Under this policy, the USSR remained stable, but the divide between
Moscow and the republics only grew larger.
Brezhnev, like Khrushchev before him, considered the nationalities problem
settled, with the 1977 Soviet constitution asserting that “a new historical continuity of
people has been formed  the Soviet people.”121 To turn this proclamation into a reality,
his regime began to advance Russian as a shared language, encouraging Russian
language publications and schooling. Some rudimentary measures were undertaken,
but Brezhnev was well aware of the response Khrushchev’s more forceful methods had
received and did not attempt to go far beyond propaganda campaigns.122 He also
avoided the controversial topic of Russian migration, tampering with census data to
prevent its full extent from erupting into controversy.123 His move towards Russian
chauvinism proved just as subdued as his original period of national appeasement.
The Growth of Dissent in the Baltic Republics
In his bid to maintain stability in the USSR, Brezhnev had maintained the status
quo in the republics. However, by giving in to regionalism while still preaching the
advancement of Russian language and culture, he had allowed national sentiments to
fester on the periphery of the Soviet Union. These manifested themselves particularly
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strongly in the Baltic republics, where resentment towards occupation and annexation
had never truly vanished.
Smallscale public incidents such as antiSoviet graffiti or the use of national
colors were not uncommon in the Baltic republics during the 1950s and 60s. In the
1970s, they were joined by more extreme protests, started by events such as as rock
concerts, mass refusal to stand at the national anthem during football matches, or public
selfimmolation.124 Dissidence was not contained to the youth: representatives of
respected societal organizations also involved themselves. In Lithuania, as in
neighboring Poland, the Catholic Church played a large role arranging mass challenges
to the Soviet state over religious rights. The intelligentsia of the republics took a different
tack, preferring to attract the attention of the Western world. In 1979, their efforts
culminated in the Baltic Appeal to the United Nations, in which 45 Lithuanian, Latvian,
and Estonian thinkers argued against the legality of the Soviet takeover of the Baltic
states. Smaller protestations were not uncommon: by the 1980s, Lithuania in particular
was responsible for more dissident publications per capita than any other republic.125
Perhaps the most significant group of dissidents was the environmentalists, who used
nature as a pretext for protesting the industrialization and militarization of the Baltic
region without facing the same stigma from the Party as nationalists would.126 Though
small and divided, Baltic protest movements slowly gained momentum throughout the
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Brezhnev era, exploiting the growing weakness of the central government in regional
affairs.
On the eve of Brezhnev’s death, no serious threat to Soviet rule in the Baltic had
emerged and the most outspoken dissidents had been jailed. But for the first time since
guerrilla bands fought the Red Army in Baltic forests, Estonians, Latvians, and
Lithuanians were willing to engage in organized, civilianled resistance to the Soviet
government. These small acts of defiance were among the first to occur in the Soviet
context and laid the groundwork for more significant protest in the near future.
Gorbachev: Glasnost, Perestroika, and Disintegration, 1985-1991
In quick succession following the death of Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and
Konstantin Chernenko each became the leader of the USSR and died after just over a
year in office. Neither addressed the nationalities in any substantive way.127 Upon the
rise of the more youthful Mikhail Gorbachev, however, the republics, along with every
other aspect of Soviet politics, experienced massive, sweeping changes. Gorbachev’s
reforms ultimately solved the nationalities problem, albeit by accidentally enabling the
secession of the republics and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
At first, Gorbachev’s reforms did not directly target the nationalities. Brezhnev’s
willingness to delegate power had left the union republics stable, and the nationalities
issue had been dismissed or ignored for decades. Gorbachev’s personal views
corresponded to the official stance of the Brezhnev regime: there was only one Soviet
th
people, comprised of equal and free nationalities. Addressing the 27
Party Congress in
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1986, he asserted that, thanks to “Lenin’s doctrine and the gains of socialism [...]
[n]ational oppression and inequality of all types and forms have been done away with
once and for all.”128 His main issue with the union republics was with their First
Secretaries, entrenched powers whom he believed to obstruct serious reform. 129 By
disregarding the nationalities issue and targeting the regional elites who had kept their
peoples in line, Gorbachev inadvertently triggered a strong national response to his
programs.
Unlike Khrushchev, Gorbachev did not use claims of localism or nationalism in
his struggle with regional authorities. Instead, his opponents were removed via
accusations of corruption or general opposition to reforming Party structure
(
perestroika
).130 While this was initially successful in several Central Asian republics, it
encountered a serious challenge in Kazakhstan, where Gorbachev replaced the Kazakh
First Secretary with an ethnic Russian and was greeted by riots and student
demonstrations. The Soviet press was unwilling to blame nationalism, instead finding
fault in supporters of the former First Secretary using “demagoguery about wounded
national dignity [...] to stir up some young people, who [...] became the instigators’ blind
tool.”131 Still, Gorbachev’s miscalculation had shown him how relevant the nationalities
problem remained in the USSR.132 In response, Gorbachev opted for an increase in

Mikhail Gorbachev, 
Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to 27th Party Congress
(Moscow:
Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986), 67.
129
Smith, 
Red Nations
, 258.
130
Ibid., 260.
131
A. Lapin, “A Bitter Lesson  It Should Be Learned by Kazakhstan’s Young Communist League Aktiv and
Those Engaged in the Upbringing of Young People,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, January 10, 1987. In 
Current
Digest of the Soviet Press
39, no.1 (January 1987), 4.

132
Kemp, 
Nationalism and Socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
, 193.
128

49

federalism, including an unheardof measure: open, multiparty elections in each of the
republics.
Residents of the Baltic republics welcomed the chance to elect their leadership.
They had already benefited from the first years of Gorbachev’s rule. Under the policy of
glasnost’
(openness), Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians were willing to expand the
scope of their dissident activities. Environmental issues were at the heart of their first
large protests of the Gorbachev era, but they contained a nationalist element: the
protested issues, such as the construction of a nuclear reactor or a hydroelectric dam,
would have required thousands of migrant laborers to move to the region.133 The central
government actually encouraged similar movements throughout the Soviet Union,
believing them to be an effective means of weakening local Party organizations
opposed to 
perestroika
.134 The success of early mass protests emboldened the
dissidents to launch more overtly political campaigns. By 1987, rallies celebrated
preoccupation holidays, protests erupted over the Stalinist deportations of the 1940s,
and old national flags began to be flown openly.
With the Kazakh student protests still recent, the Party initially condemned the
politicization of Baltic demonstrations. When the Latvian opposition group Helsinki86
organized a protest in all three Baltic republics against the MolotovRibbentropp Pact in
August 1987, they were roundly condemned. Soviet news organizations accused the
protesters of seeking to celebrate fascist collaborators and of having ties to the West.
The deportations of 1941, also an object of protest, were claimed to have largely
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targeted fascists.135 While they were willing to employ this strong rhetoric to combat the
protesters, the authorities mostly shied away from the use of force. By 1988, the official
stance on nationalism had softened to the point that rallies in Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania to remember Stalinist deportations were heralded as a genuine effort to
“restore historical justice [...] and to support the Party’s course of restructuring.”136
In light of the gradual reversal of central policy, local Parties approved the
formation of a new kind of organization in each of the three republics: the popular front.
Starting in Estonia in October 1988 and soon expanding to the other two Baltic
republics, the popular fronts ostensibly stood for the expansion and support of
perestroika
, but in reality represented an alliance of nonParty interests, including
nationalists and environmentalists.137 Their agenda was clearly national in character:
they defended local languages, fought immigration, and sought to increase the extent of
local sovereignty.138 The concept proved immediately appealing and soon spread to the
other union republics, aided by the original Baltic organizations. The Baltic Parties,
noting the support the popular fronts enjoyed, similarly pushed for greater freedoms
from Moscow, but to no avail: when elections took place in March of 1989, the Baltic
popular fronts emerged triumphant, ousting a number of major senior officials.
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Gorbachev’s democratizing reforms enabled the success of the popular fronts
and the consequent defeat of Brezhnevera regional officials, but he was unprepared for
the fallout of these events. He had already accepted the need to grant concessions to
the Baltic republics, ultimately even announcing the existence of the secret protocols of
the MolotovRibbentrop Pact through which the Baltic states had been annexed.139 The
demands of Baltic republics, however, accelerated far past what Gorbachev was willing
to give. Emboldened by electoral success and the collapse of Soviet control in Eastern
Europe, the new governments of the Baltic republics moved swiftly towards
independence. Lithuania led the charge, declaring its independence from the USSR in
March 1990, which Latvia and Estonia announced their intentions to gradually transition
to full independence soon after. Gorbachev, under pressure from factions within the
Party and fearful of the precedent set by allowing Baltic independence, elected to use
force in a last bid to keep the Soviet Union intact. Soviet troops propped up fauxpopular
movements and seized communications centers in both Latvia and Lithuania, but were
soon checked by mass demonstrations not only locally but throughout the USSR.140
Unlike Khrushchev before him, Gorbachev’s attempt at reversing his reforms came too
late to succeed. Soon, the Baltic states would be joined by every other union republic in
independence.
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Understanding the Nationalities Factor in Imperial Russia and the USSR
In 1991, the last European multiethnic empire came to an end when the Soviet
Union collapsed. Many causes led to its demise, but the central role occupied by the
nationalities is clearly visible from the abundance of postSoviet states in our
contemporary geography. But these nations were not born from the Soviet system: their
roots lie in the history of its immediate predecessor, the Russian Empire. With its
reliance on local elites challenged by those elites’ desire for greater autonomy, Imperial
Russia struggled to devise a replacement for its aging system of rule. Rather than
employing a consistent strategy to ensure longterm control, it alternated between the
contradictory policies of forced assimilation and encouragement of competition between
local minorities, as seen in the Baltic region. Constant fluctuations in policy carried out
on the whims of local administrators did little to endear the local populace to the
Russian government and fueled nascent national movements, who nearly all attempted
to secure independence in the wake of the collapse of the Empire, sometimes
successfully. The Bolsheviks underestimated nationalist desires as they sought to keep
the lands of the former Empire together and believed a federalist system would alleviate
tensions long enough for ideology to overcome national boundaries. Instead, the Soviet
Union often resembled Imperial Russia as each leader allowed greater national
autonomy and increased the extent of federalism before reversing course and
repressing the nationalities while preaching Russian chauvinism. To the budding
nations within the republics, this proved irritating; to annexed territories like the Baltic
states, it proved intolerable. After centuries of constant and capricious Russian
53

mismanagement, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania led the way for the ultimate
disintegration of Russian empires.
The aftershocks of the collapse are still felt in Russia, the Baltic states, and all
the former republics of the USSR. Russian and Soviet rule left tangible evidence of its
existence, most clearly in the presence of a large Russianspeaking diaspora. As the
ideological justifications for preventing national independence began to ring hollow, the
Soviet state emphasized the potential plight of these Russian speakers of the
breakaway republics. It is an attitude which can still be witnessed in the words and
actions of the Russian government to this day, as the interactions between Moscow and
its former subjects continue to be defined by the imperial policies of the past.
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